Tuesday, October 09, 2012

Arminian mysterians

If a Calvinist invokes mystery, that’s evasive and euphemistic:
The second major objection to Calvinism is a recurring pattern of euphemism we find among Calvinist writers…they typically try to evade the force of the problem by characterizing it as a mystery, paradox, antinomy, or “biblical tension” J. Walls & D. Baggett, Good God: The Theistic Foundations of Morality (Oxford 2011), 72.
But if an Arminian invokes mystery, that’s hunky-dory:
These passages are difficult, and no matter what we might say about them, we don’t dispel the mystery of them. J. Walls & D. Baggett, Good God: The Theistic Foundations of Morality (Oxford 2011), 136.
I am very much in sympathy with arguments that defend libertarian freedom, but I feel the force of objections by critics who think the whole notion is mysterious, and at times even seems to be incoherent. J. Walls, “Why No Classical Theist, Let Alone Orthodox Christian, Should Ever Be a Compatibilist,” Philosophia Christi 13/1 (Summer 2011), 77.

1 comment:

  1. For a while I thought that I could get away from debating Calvinism and Arminianism, but I am beginning to see that you cannot. I am at a Baptist College in the south, and Calvinism and Arminianism are hot topics on campus. One of my professors and I have had friendly exchanges in class and I brought up the point that Calvinists typically are not tied to Compatibalism as a theory of the will, that it is possible that we do not have a good theory, but scripture warrants the belief in predestination. I said that as a Calvinist if he refuted Compataibialism that it would not undercut my belief in Sovereingty and responsibility, and that I saw no reason to accept a libertarian view of the will. I noted the very real possibility that since we cannot comprehend God fully, but only what he has chose to reveal, that we may never be able to solve the Sovereignty/Responsibility tension, but that we can work on philosophical models. He rejected this, and said that we needed a theory that didn't implicate God in sin, and that no atheist would accept the idea that sovereingthy/responsibility was a mystery. He proceeded to argue that moral responsibility requires a "quantum of freedom", which when he explained it was about the most mysterious thing I had ever heard before.

    I have to wonder why anyone thinks a materialist or atheist would accept human freedom. Most atheist I know are some form of determinist. I also brought up the point that sinful man doesn't want God in the first place, so it doesn't really matter what theory of the will you hold, man hates God. That didn't really go over very well.

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