Sunday, March 18, 2012

Is God a monstrous madman?


Furthermore, Washington does not in any way benefit from the execution of Andre…
 
On the other hand, consider this analogy. Imagine a parent who is able to control each and every action of his children, and furthermore is able to do so by controlling their thoughts and inclinations. He is thus able to determine each and all actions taken by those children. He is also able to guarantee that they desire to do everything that they do, and this is exactly what he does. He puts them in a special playroom that contains not only toys but also gasoline and matches, and then he gives them explicit instructions (with severe warnings) to avoid touching the gasoline and matches. Stepping out of sight, he determines that the children indeed begin to play with the gasoline and matches. When the playroom is ablaze and the situation desperate, he rushes in to save them (well, some of them).
 
When they ask about the situation, their father tells them that this tragic occurrence had been determined by him, and indeed that it was a smashing success–it had worked out in exact accordance with his plan. He then reminds them of his instructions and warnings and he reminds them further that they willingly violated his commands. They should be grateful for their rescue, and they should understand that the others got what they deserved.
 
The children are puzzled by this, and one wants to know why such a compassionate father does not rescue the others (when it is clearly within his power to do so). His answer is this: this has happened so that everyone could see how smart he is (for being able to know how to do all this), how powerful he is (for being able to control everything and then effectively rescue them), how merciful he is (for rescuing the children who broke his rules), and how just he is (for leaving the others to their fate in the burning playroom).
 
Surely the fact that such a man is a monster is beyond dispute…And if he were to add that he did it for the good of his children, we would rightly consider him a madman as well as a moral monster.


Thomas McCall, “I Believe in God's Sovereign Goodness: A Rejoinder to John Piper,” TrinJ 29.2 (Fall 2008): 241-42.

By way of reply:

i) McCall is critiquing John Piper’s two-wills model of Calvinism. I myself don’t subscribe to that model.

ii) Piper isn’t a philosopher, so there may be some weaknesses in Piper’s formulations. For instance, Jeremy Pierce is critical of how Piper formulates the self-glorification of God.

iii) I don’t know why McCall imagines that God is the beneficiary of election and reprobation. The elect are the beneficiaries.

Perhaps McCall is misled by the ambiguities of God doing something for his own glory. But God has nothing to gain. Rather, the elect gain from the manifestation of God’s glory.

iv) If McCall is alleging that the father in this scenario is monstrous simply because he determined the outcome, then that begs the question. In that event he’s treating as libertarianism as a given. But that’s something he needs to argue for.

v) His illustration is compromised by the parent/child metaphor. That’s designed to push the reader’s buttons. It’s ironic that a libertarian would try to coerce the reader through emotional manipulation.

And he isn’t consistent with the metaphor, for within the confines of his illustration, the children have, in fact, done nothing to deserve their fate.

vi) Even parent/child metaphors can backfire. When the Menendez brothers murder their parents, we shouldn’t feel sorry for the orphaned brothers!

vii) But if we trade the parent/child metaphor for a judge/felon metaphor, like a judge who sentences a trigger-man to death by hanging, that ought to provoke moral satisfaction in the verdict.

viii) Finally, McCall’s illustration is an extended metaphor, but it has a literal counterpart. In the real world there are real tykes who play with matches and accidentally set themselves on fire. Some of them burn to death while others survive, but are horribly maimed for life.

McCall’s Arminian God can see that coming. He knows what will happen unless he steps in to prevent it. McCall’s God has complete control over that situation. He can rescue every child who’s on the verge of self-immolation.

Indeed, he ultimately put them in that situation. He created a world in which he foresaw that outcome. By but going right ahead, he guaranteed the outcome. It’s inevitable that they will set themselves on fire unless he intervenes–which is clearly within his power to do. Why does he stand by and let the screaming child go up in flames?

Surely it’s not because McCall’s God must defer to their freewill. Aren’t young children in a condition of diminished responsibility? Isn’t that a presupposition of McCall’s hypothetical scenario? The children don’t know any better. Ther lack the cognitive development to appreciate the danger. Hence, it’s the duty of the father to protect his kids from playing with matches around gasoline. Hence, the father is culpable for exposing them to harm.

Well, shouldn’t McCall’s God be at least a conscientious a father as a human father ought to be under those circumstances? Shouldn’t McCall’s God look out for the welfare of little kids who are about to unwittingly commit self-immolation? So why isn’t McCall’s God a monster?

9 comments:

  1. "Rather, the elect gain from the manifestation of God’s glory."

    - God predestines many souls to Hell so for His own glory.

    - However, God does not benefit from the manifestation of His own glory: His elect do.

    - Therefore, it's His elect that benefit from the destiny of eternal Hell for those souls.

    The question is: what do they gain, exactly? Are they more grateful to God by seeing the torment that would have been theirs? This seems less a character assassination of God than of His elect, no?

    I do understand the notion of how happiness is sometimes related to the real (or imagined) contentment of others: for example, we might appreciate a very spacious and well-appointed home probably more so when we realize that our peers may be stuck with a two-bedroom apartment.

    Yet, being unable to be happy or content without the knowledge of the misery of others doesn't seem a very noble sentiment, does it?

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  2. "i) McCall is critiquing John Piper’s two-wills model of Calvinism. I myself don’t subscribe to that model."

    Would you mind presenting your model? Or perhaps providing a taxonomy of models dealing with the issue?

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  3. James said:
    The question is: what do they gain, exactly?

    Is God's glory manifested in His mercy also? If so then they gain from that mercy. You seem to think that Steve is claiming that God's glory is only manifested in His just damnation of rebel sinners. The problem that Arminians have is they seem to want to treat everyone as morally neutral when they are actually morally culpable. They further seem to think that they escape theodicy issues through the concept of "libertarian freewill", but they have the same problems. God could have created man without the ability to sin, but He didn't. He created men He knew with certainty would be damned, so how does freewill solve the dilemma? So the issue with Armianism is not the goodness of God, but thier ongoing rebellion against the rule of God. No matter how they may try to avoid it the truth is that Arminians want man to be in control of salvation and subject God to thier notion of morality.

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  4. David,

    I expect Steve's model would look pretty much like the Adam and Eve model.

    While the analogy that was presented- breaks down in the very first sentence. The very first part of the very first sentence... "his children".
    Or are we going to believe that all of His creation is "his children"?

    Was Jesus just being a little hyperbolic when He said that "all are not His children" (John 8:44)?

    And breaks down in the second part of the first sentence as well- when it suggests that these are "God's inclinations".

    Was Jesus just being a little hyperbolic when He said that these are the "inclinations of the devil" (John 8:44 again)?

    A secondary causation as opposed to a primary causation?

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  5. JAMES SAID:

    "Yet, being unable to be happy or content without the knowledge of the misery of others doesn't seem a very noble sentiment, does it?"

    Does it? When we see a brutal dictator toppled, is it ignoble to rejoice in his ill-fortune?

    Or to take a different example, say three high school buddies go hiking. They are overtaken by a winter storm. One dies while the other two barely survive.

    After the survivors recover, they grieve the death of their friend, yet the grueling experience of nearly losing their own lives, as well as helplessly watching their friend die from exposure, makes them value life in a way they didn't before tragedy struck.

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  6. David J. Houston said...

    "Would you mind presenting your model? Or perhaps providing a taxonomy of models dealing with the issue?"

    I've often discussed my position in relation to the well-meant offer.

    ReplyDelete
  7. "After the survivors recover, they grieve the death of their friend, yet the grueling experience of nearly losing their own lives, as well as helplessly watching their friend die from exposure, makes them value life in a way they didn't before tragedy struck."

    Yes, but if there were some way for the survivors to value their own lives without the deaths of their friends, wouldn't that be the preferred option? In fact, if I had to choose, I'd rather be LESS happy and my friends live (or not suffer) than be HAPPIER at the expense of theirs. I can barely tolerate seeing those close to me in pain: were it possible, I'd sacrifice some of my own contentment to alleviate some of their own sorrow. When it's been possible, I think I've done so in some small ways.

    What you are suggesting is that the saved cannot appreciate God's glory without the existence of the damned.

    More problematic is the assertion that the memory of the damned shall be "blotted out" in the minds of the Elect (at least I think I've read that here). So, in essence, the purpose of the damned seems for naught, then, yes?

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  8. JAMES SAID:

    "More problematic is the assertion that the memory of the damned shall be 'blotted out' in the minds of the Elect (at least I think I've read that here). So, in essence, the purpose of the damned seems for naught, then, yes?"

    That's William Lane Craig's speculation, not mine. I've criticized his speculation.

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  9. JAMES SAID:

    "Yes, but if there were some way for the survivors to value their own lives without the deaths of their friends, wouldn't that be the preferred option?"

    Now you're moving the goalpost. That wasn't your original argument.

    Moreover, you haven't presented a concrete alternative.

    "In fact, if I had to choose, I'd rather be LESS happy and my friends live (or not suffer) than be HAPPIER at the expense of theirs. I can barely tolerate seeing those close to me in pain: were it possible, I'd sacrifice some of my own contentment to alleviate some of their own sorrow. When it's been possible, I think I've done so in some small ways."

    Wisdom/insight and happiness are not the same thing. Suppose a woman is the love of my life. Problem is, I let the opportunity slip by. I didn't act fast enough on my feelings, so another guy married her.

    I'd be happier if a never knew her in the first place. Yet I'd rather be a bit sadder, and live with my regrets, than miss out on knowing her. That's still a precious time of life for me. One I look back on with elegiac fondness. I wouldn't trade that for something else.

    What you are suggesting is that the saved cannot appreciate God's glory without the existence of the damned.

    "What you are suggesting is that the saved cannot appreciate God's glory without the existence of the damned."

    The gratuity of grace is best illustrated by the fact that God doesn't save everyone.

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